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ABSTRACT
After thirty years of commercial nuclear plant operation, the nuclear industry has
achieved dramatic improvements in the safe and reliable operation of its electrical
generating stations. Recent indications, however, are that the rate of improvement may
be slowing, particularly in the area of human performance. The nuclear industry has been
and will be heavily dependent on rigid structure and centralized organization. Defense-
in-depth is a key element in the prevention of human error or equipment malfunction and
will continue to be so. The accident at Three Mile Island significantly increased the
emphasis placed on procedures as a means of preventing human error. However, current
reductions in the rate of human performance improvement have prompted reevaluation of
the ability of improvement techniques, which have unquestionably achieved noteworthy
success in the past, to enjoy similar success in the future. Years of adding more and more
detail to procedures may in fact be becoming counterproductive. The majority of work
on procedure use and procedure violations that has been performed to date deals primarily
with the psychological aspects of human behavior. The ability of the procedure user to
follow the procedure without becoming confused, however, has been left relatively
unanalyzed. This paper attempts to characterize the recent slowdown in human
performance improvement and the dynamics associated with human performance, to
ascertain the significance of procedure complexity, and to put forward a technique to
achieve an optimum balance of the critical factors that constitute human error defense-in-
depth. The embodiment of the technique, referred to as the A + B + C Method, is a
mnemonic to allow workers and supervisors to balance the level of procedure detail, the
worker's level of knowledge, and the amount of supervisory involvement required when
executing work tasks.
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1.0 Introduction / Overview
The nuclear industry has undergone tremendous change during the past 30 years
of commercial electric generation. The early years were somewhat unremarkable.
However, 1979 brought a watershed event that forever reshaped the entire industry. That
event, of course, was the accident at Three Mile Island. It was that event that brought the
nation's (indeed the world's) attention to the possible consequences of even a single
mistake. As a result, regulatory oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was
dramatically increased. Additionally, the industry established the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (INPO) to promote the highest levels of nuclear plant safety and
reliability in the operation of commercial nuclear power plants. What makes INPO
unique is that while the nuclear industry oversees INPO activities, it endowed INPO to
bring pressure for change on individual members. The industry's recognition that the
actions and performance of any one utility affect all nuclear utilities served as a principal
motivation for its commitment and support of INPO.
1.1 Classification of Events
And so the pursuit of excellence began. One of INPO's first actions was to
establish a method of collecting and evaluating information concerning adverse events at
all nuclear electric generating stations. For each licensed U.S. nuclear facility, certain
events must be reported to the NRC as licensee event reports. Reporting requirements are
stated in Title 10, Part 50.73 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.73).
NUREG-1022 and its Supplement No. 1 provide guidance on preparing licensee event
reports (LERs). These event reports are also sent to INPO, where they are classified in
one of three categories (INPO 94-001):
Significant - An event that caused or has the potential to cause a significant
reduction in plant safety or reliability. Examples include events that required a
reactor scram and the need for operation of one or more safety systems (such as
emergency core cooling, primary system over pressure protection, extended use of
emergency power systems), caused major equipment damage (such as damage to
important valves or major piping), or required unusual actions to manage the
event.
Not Significant - Event met requirements for reporting but does not meet all
requirements for being classified as significant.
Noteworthy - Not significant, but may indicate or be a precursor to maintenance,
operation, administrative, or management problem.
1.2 Trend in Events
The nuclear industry can point to a trend of continued improvement, having
achieved dramatic improvements in the safe and reliable operation of its electrical
generating stations. Significant events have dropped from a high of almost 2.4 per unit
per year in 1987 to only one for every ten units per year in 1997.1 The earlier progress
in reducing events, however, appears to have slowed over the past three years. For
although the number of significant events has dropped, the number of non-significant
events has leveled off and the number of noteworthy events is increasing. It is difficult to
precisely determine whether the increasing number of deficiencies is due to a relative
increase in human error or whether it is the result of increased attention and monitoring.
In either case, it is reasonable to assume that the rate of improvement is slowing. Data
from INPO's event database for the seven most recent years is provided below:
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Annual Report, 1997
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Figure 1: Total Events (INPO Database - 1991 "Not Significant" data incomplete)
Parallel analysis of the NRC's human performance event database confirms that
while efforts to improve human performance since 1990 have been successful, there has
been a leveling off of significant events from 1994 to the present as shown in Figure 2.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996*
Figure 2: Human Error in Significant Events (NRC Database)
Total Events in NRC Human Performance Event Database
*Additional events may be added (analysis in progress)
Additionally, a sample of 18 stations in the NRCs database is consistent with the
INPO database in showing that the number of reported non-significant human
performance deficiencies has started to increase.2
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Figure 3: NRC Report Human Performance Contributing Factors
2 NRC information does not disclose the specific identity of each plant. However, a random sample of 18different stations represents almost one-third of the US nuclear industry and therefore representative.
2.0 Human Performance vs. Equipment Performance
The most significant contribution to event reductions has come from the
industry's success in improving the reliability of the equipment. Unplanned automatic
scrams have dropped from an average of 7.3 per 7000 hours critical per unit to less than
0.8 per unit for the same time period. Broader indicators of equipment reliability show
similar improvements. Perhaps the best indicator is that of safety system performance.
The World Association for Nuclear Operations has established the challenging goal of
less than 2% unavailability for key safety related equipment, such as emergency power
diesel generators and safety injection systems. Figure 4 shows the percentage of stations
in the US that have been able to meet or exceed this level of equipment reliability:
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Figure 4: US Nuclear Station Safety System Performance
At this point it is important to point out that with regard to safety system
unavailability, there is a blurred but nonetheless unavoidable dependency between
equipment performance, human error, and organizational weaknesses. The influence of
human performance on equipment reliability can be significant. For example, safety
system performance can vary widely depending on the quality of the operating procedure
or maintenance techniques. Davoudian et al argue that "in the case of a single
component, the quality of maintenance may simultaneously affect the length of time
spent on maintenance, the probability of failure due to testing and maintenance errors,
probability of component failure on demand, component failure rate, and the frequency
with which corrective actions must be carried out" (Davoudian K , et al , 1994).
Accordingly, both the NRC and INPO are sensitive to this interrelationship and make
every effort possible to differentiate between human error and equipment failure. For
example, if an event initiated by the failure of a pump to start was later determined to be
principally caused by operator error, the equipment unavailability would be identified as
being due to human error and therefore not as an equipment deficiency. Therefore, for
the purposes of this study, events attributed to human error take into consideration the
adverse impact inappropriate human behavior can have on equipment performance.
In 1985, a detailed analysis was performed to determine the leading causes of
significant events (INPO 85-027). Over 350 error contributors were identified for the 180
significant events that occurred in 1983 and 1984. Fifty-two percent of those
contributors were determined to be primarily due to human performance deficiencies, and
40 percent were primarily due to equipment malfunctions and the remaining eight percent
were attributed to external or other causes. Five years later, a similar analysis was
performed to determine if there were any changes in the trend. In this analysis, the 126
events occurring in 1990 were evaluated, and it was determined that of the 882 primary or
causal factors involved, the fraction attributed to human error had risen to 70 percent,
while equipment malfunctions now only accounted for only 23 percent, and 7 percent for
other causes (INPO 91-010).
Of particular interest is the analysis of the most recent data available (1996) that
shows that even after fifteen years of focused attention on improving human performance,
human errors continue to account for 68 percent of the primary contributors to significant
events. In other words, while the dramatic increase in emphasis placed on the reduction
of human error of the past six years has helped to reduce the number of significant errors,
the rate of improvement in equipment performance continues to significantly exceed the
rate of human performance improvement.
2.1 Impact on plant safety
History has shown that the consequences of human errors are far worse than those
of equipment failure. From the beginning, nuclear facilities have had detailed and
extensive reviews of safety system equipment design, equipment reliability, and
equipment performance. If weaknesses were identified, additional corrective measures
were implemented. Improvements have been made to the point where the principal risk
to plant safety now comes from the people who operate it. Nowhere is this fact made
more dramatically than in an INPO document released shortly after the accident at
Chernobyl. It discusses the fact that since the beginning of the commercial nuclear power
industry, there have been a total of 13 different accidents that were severe enough to
result in actual damage to the nuclear fuel. In all but one of those events, the principal
cause of the accident was not equipment malfunction, but rather human error (INPO 91-
008).
2.2 Impact on Unplanned Capability Loss Factor
Human error impacts more than just plant safety. Errors also account for a
significant amount of lost electrical generating time, known within the industry as the
Unplanned Capability Loss Factor (UCLF). Station UCLF is defined by INPO as "the
percentage of maximum energy generation a plant is not supplying to the electric grid
because of unplanned energy losses (such as unplanned shutdowns, outage extensions, or
load reductions). To determine how much UCLF is affected by human errors, eight
commercial nuclear stations (four boiling water reactors and four pressurized water
reactors) were randomly selected for analysis. A careful study of the power generation
history of each plant from was performed for the ten years between January 1, 1988
through January 1, 1998. Every deviation from maximum power generation greater than
1 percent for the entire ten year period was evaluated in order to determine the cause and
duration of any unplanned (forced) reductions in power output3 . The data represents
sudden or unexpected power reductions and excludes planned shutdowns for refueling,
regulatory enforcement, or major equipment repairs. It should be noted that these
estimates of human contribution are quite conservative in that lost generation time was
only attributed to human error if the cause was explicitly reported as human error. In
practice, however, many of the equipment deficiencies that cause lost generation are the
direct result of human error such as inadequate/improper maintenance, incorrect design,
etc..
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Figure 5: Personnel Error Contribution to Lost Electrical Generation
The data suggest that for this sample of NPPs, human error is responsible for an
average of at least 41 percent of all unplanned or forced generation losses. Over the ten
year period, that equates to an average of 922 effective full power hours (EFPH) for each
3 Analysis performed by the author. Data was obtained from Operating Plant Experience Code, a
proprietary database of the RC Haley and Rollins Company. Information within the database is obtained
primarily from NRC records.
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station. And by applying the industry thumb rule of the cost associated with plant
shutdowns of $1 million / day, the average monetary cost associated with personnel errors
at these plants can be estimated at roughly $32 million each. This is also a conservative
estimate in that it does not include regulatory fines that often accompany human errors, or
the adverse effect on the plant caused by changing temperatures and pressures when
power levels are changed.
Much as any number of factors can cause a machine to malfunction, a large
number of factors can cause a person to make an error. Human errors, however, are often
more difficult to predict, and there are literally hundreds of human behavior studies and
almost as many different models that attempt to explain why someone may commit an
error or perform an incorrect action. Accordingly, this paper will build on work
previously performed and attempt to provide for the reader a simple and practical method
for understanding and applying human performance improvement philosophies. While
the events analyzed herein occurred in the nuclear field, the challenges, lessons, and
recommendations are likely to be also applicable to other industries. The goal is to
understand how deficiencies are identified, processed, researched, and resolved. Once
this process is defined, opportunities to further improve human reliability and mitigate the
consequences of deficiencies will be presented. The analysis contained herein has been
carried out by conducting interviews with senior managers, reviewing specific plant
documents and industry trade journals, and researching documents from INPO, the NRC,
and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
3.0 Past Approaches to Human Performance
Commercial nuclear power, more than almost any other industry, functions as
what organizational theory refers to as a machine bureaucracy, with "highly specialized,
routine operating tasks, formalized procedures in the operating core, a proliferation of
rules, regulations, and formalized communication throughout the organization, large-
scale units at the operating level, relatively centralized power for decision making, and an
elaborate administrative structure with a sharp distinction between line and staff'
(Mintzberg, 1979). The need to consistently perform the myriad of tasks that comprise
the operation of a nuclear plant, and the need to perform them correctly, makes written
procedures a fundamental part of the nuclear power business. Indeed, when properly
written and used, procedures are an important line of defense to ensure that equipment is
operated and maintained within design specifications.
3.1 The Influence of Three Mile Island
The accident at Three Mile Island caused much greater attention to be placed on
the use of procedures. Numerous modifications and backfits were mandated for all
nuclear power plants, including such things as symptom-based procedures, new training,
and new equipment (Thompson, et al, 1997). In fact, the industry began to shift to
operating almost entirely in a "rule-based" environment, as opposed to a "knowledge-
based" environment (Reason, 1990). The intent was to eliminate, to the highest degree
possible, the necessity for an operator to make decisions in situations that had the
potential to be confusing or time sensitive. Or, to paraphrase the words of James Reason,
"to move operators out of knowledge-based and into rule-based performance". This was
a logical approach, and studies have shown that knowledge-based performance is the
riskiest performance mode when it comes to expected error rate (Reason, 1990). When
encountering an unfamiliar situation, people may make erroneous assumptions to ease the
load on their mind. Consequently, they tend to generate solutions based upon stored rules
that appear similar to the present situation. Because of the limitations of human nature
and the limited knowledge of both the problem that may exist at the time, the belief was
that all attempts should be made to relieve the individual from having to operate in the
knowledge-based (analysis of unfamiliar problem situations using only stored
knowledge) performance mode and instead perform at either the rule-based (pre-packaged
actions, determined by recognition of familiar problem situations) or skill-based (routine
actions in a familiar situation) performance level. It was thought that the optimum course
of action could be evaluated and determined by the most knowledgeable people well in
advance of any plausible maintenance or operations task and then proceduralized, thus
reducing the likelihood of an incorrect decision being made during the time of actual
performance of the task.
3.2 Procedural Complexity
In pursuing this goal, procedures became much more detailed. After all,
knowledge-based situations by their very nature are usually puzzling and unfamiliar to
the individual, involve a great deal of uncertainty, and are usually stressful. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission analysis of significant events has reported that serious events
seem always to involve both unexpected plant conditions and unfavorable performance
shaping factors (PSFs) that combine into what the NRC calls "error-forcing" contexts
(Thompson, et al, 1997). To develop procedures that take workers out of the knowledge-
based performance mode required eliminating the need for workers or operators to
perform rigorous problem solving. Procedures would also need to include enough
information to remove any uncertainty or stress about the task to be performed. The
dilemma facing procedure writers, therefore, was how to develop a procedure to address
unanticipated or unusual plant conditions. The response to date has been an attempt to
anticipate every viable plant status or condition and include appropriate direction.
According to the NRC human performance data base, the most common action
taken to prevent recurrence of errors is to include additional information, work steps, and
limitations in existing maintenance work instructions or operating procedures. The intent
is to make procedures so all-inclusive that anyone assigned to the task would be able
correctly perform the evolution (lowest-common-denominator-approach). However, after
years and years of adding more and more steps, procedures have grown in size and
complexity to the point that, in some cases, they actually contribute to the problem.
Many procedures have become difficult to follow, so lengthy and with so many caveats
and restrictions that is it often difficult to accomplish the task without having to stop and
have the procedure somehow revised (disruption is a leading cause of errors), and quite
laborious to keep current (another significant cause of error).
3.3 Procedure Effectiveness
The 1985 INPO root cause analysis discussed earlier identified deficient
procedures or the failure to follow procedures as the leading cause of human error (INPO
85-027). And even with five years of focused attention to procedure improvements, the
1990 INPO study showed no significant reduction in the contribution of written
procedures and documents to human error (INPO 91-010). A history of human errors
attributed to written procedure and document deficiencies is presented in Figure 6. 4
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Figure 6: Errors Attributed to Procedure Deficiencies
The seriousness and extent of procedure problems was further substantiated by an
NRC study which found procedures to be a contributing factor in more than 65% of the
1995 LERs. Forty percent of those LERs involved inadequate procedures, with another
4 JNPO event causal factor database. The sharp increase in identified deficiencies in 1991 can be attributed
at least in part to increased awareness and surveillance caused by INPO 91-010.
26% due to workers not following the procedure (Spiker, 1997). In fact, a review of
annual inspection reports performed at all nuclear stations in the US shows that of the
3438 items cited in the reports, procedure inadequacy was the leading human
performance issue. (Rubin & Meyer, 1998)
Figure 7: Human Performance Issues in 1996 NRC Inspection Reports
Analysis of the INPO human performance database again agrees with that of the
NRC, the only difference worth noting being the reversal of the top two factors. In these
two studies, work factors and work practices are synonymous and refer to the actual skill
and knowledge of the technician or operator.
Human Performance Event Causal Factors (INPO) 1995-1996
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And in a recent address to the IEEE, members of the NRC and various national
laboratories reported that even after considerable expense and effort to implement human
performance improvements since TMI, there is "increasing evidence that there are
persistent and generic human performance problems that have not been fixed"
(Thompson, et al, 1997). They point to the fact that in the TMI-2 event, operators
inappropriately terminated high pressure injection, resulting in insufficient cooling of the
core and ultimate core damage. They then point to the NRC's Office of Analysis and
Evaluation of Operational Data 1995 report that identified 14 events over the previous 41
months in which engineered safety features were inappropriately bypassed (Kauffman,
1995).
For specific examples, one need look no further than the recent performance of
control room operators. These operators have been among the most highly trained
workers of any kind, selected for their superior knowledge of nuclear plant operation and
years of experience. Yet, in 1994 and 1995, there were at least eight significant events
where operator errors or inappropriate behavior potentially jeopardized the safe operation
of the plant. The type and severity of each unsafe act, along with the implications for
human performance improvement, were outlined by INPO President Zack T. Pate at a
1995 annual meeting of all nuclear utility chief executive officers'.
In September 1994 at the Wolf Creek NPP, a rapid loss of reactor coolant
inventory occurred when operators in the control room mistakenly aligned the shutdown
decay heat removal system to the refueling water storage tank. Had the loss of coolant
continued for just a few more minutes, reactor vessel voiding due to steam formation
would have occurred, and emergency core cooling systems could have been rendered
inoperable. A prerequisite in the procedure that would have prevented the event was
marked as "not applicable" by the control room supervisor without good reason (NRC
Information Notice 95-03). Likewise, in April 1995 at the WNP-2 Nuclear Power Plant
(NPP), a section of blowdown piping was potentially overpressurized when the control
room supervisor deliberately ignored a procedure caution. Perhaps more surprising is
5 Speech by Zack T. Pate @ INPO CEO Conference, Atlanta, GA, Nov. 3, 1995
that the shift manager concurred with the action of the control room supervisor without
reviewing the procedure or investigating the matter (NRC Information Notice 50-397/95-
13). In July 1995 the Hope Creek NPP experienced a partial loss of shutdown cooling
when an operator placed the recirculation pump discharge valve in an intermediate
position instead of cycling it as required by the procedure (Hope Creek LER 95-016-96).
The preceding incidents are just a few examples where, even though the operators
had clear procedural directions, the events still occurred. Montmayeul et al performed a
more comprehensive study while evaluating the need for safety indicators (Montmayeul,
et al, 1994). As part of an Electricit6 de France (EDF) attempt to account for human
factors in PSAs (PHRA), they conducted more than 300 control room simulator exercises
involving over 100 operator teams. The authors list one of the most useful insights
obtained by the study as the list of deviations from mandatory procedures made by the
operators. In fact, more than 750 departures from strict observance of procedures were
collected. After observing the performance of operators in the control room simulators,
they concluded that "the operations performed do not always correspond exactly to what
is indicated in the instructions, not that the deviations were necessarily errors"
(Montmayeul, et al, 1994). The research suggests that even with the most detailed
procedures, some situations or plant conditions cannot be anticipated, so there must be
allowance made for operator skill, experience, and judgment.
Finally, according to a study performed for the NRC, approximately 60 percent of
loss of shutdown cooling and loss of electrical power events involve test, calibration,
maintenance, repair, or installation errors (Barriere, et al, 1994). Each of these tasks
requires the use of either a maintenance or testing procedure. This research, combined
with the many examples from US operating experience, makes it clear that an expectation
for strict compliance to ever-increasingly detailed and complex procedures has resulted in
only limited success in preventing human error.
Work procedures will continue to be an essential part of the defense-in-depth
approach to preventing human error. However, continued dependence on procedure use
as the principal barrier to human error may be naive. Defense-in-depth is achieved when
multiple functions and associated applications exist for a task. However, caution is in
order. Several redundant defenses can add complexity to a task making performance
more difficult because failed defenses become harder to see (Reason, 1997).
Compounding the increasing complexity of procedures is the decline in functional
literacy of the work force. A survey sponsored by the US Department of education
revealed that literacy related problems are costly and lead to serious errors (Barton, et al,
1990). The very nature of the detailed, lengthy, and highly technical procedures is at
odds with the declining functional literacy of the general population. Indeed, the
divergence caused by increased procedural complexity and declining functional literacy
and experience in the workforce is a likely contributor to the slowing of human
performance improvement efforts seen in recent years.
4.0 Reflecting on Effectiveness of Past Approaches
In response to the rising concern over the adequacy of procedures and their
effectiveness in preventing human errors, past approaches to addressing human
performance are being reevaluated. Perhaps, it is reasoned, the slowdown in performance
improvement rates can be attributed to the flurry of new process, organizational, and
training changes that have been implemented in an attempt to make further reductions in
human errors. Indeed, it is possible that changes being made in an attempt to further
improve human reliability are beginning to carry a "risk". Perhaps the broad and
sweeping changes that have characterized human performance improvement activities
will no longer be effective as the more obvious problems are resolved and more subtle
improvements are attempted. By comparison, careful consideration of potential negative
effects that could be brought on by even minor equipment design modifications are the
norm when addressing equipment performance deficiencies. For example, engineers at
the Barseback NPP in Sweden consider the probability that the maintenance will be
performed incorrectly before increasing the preventive maintenance frequency for a piece
of equipment6
Finally, perhaps the reason for the slowing in human performance improvement
rates is because, with fewer and fewer significant events occurring, corrective action
programs are now more reliant on precursor errors and "near misses", which offer less
data for analysis and for which the cause and effect relationship is less definitive. These
possibilities and more are currently being discussed by leading human performance
experts from around the world.
4.1 A Tale of Two Cultures
Evidence continues to grow suggesting the existence of two "cultures" at a plant;
a formal culture that is defined and prescribed by the procedures, and an informal culture
that is manifested in the way tasks are actually performed. At issue is determining why
6 Personal discussion with Mr. Ingmar Agrem, Manager of Systems Engineering, KSU Barseback, Mar. 15,
1997, Huy, Belgium).
workers and operators are unable (or unwilling) to follow procedures. Why do well-
intentioned people make conscious decisions to deviate from clear expectations that they
clearly understand? What is it about a procedure and its use that allows people to
convince themselves that the best course of actions is to succumb to temptations such as
"it won't make a difference if I just..." or "whoever wrote this procedure must not have
been aware that..."?
This dichotomy between formal and informal cultures has the potential to be quite
serious and is beginning to receive increased attention. After all, it is through procedures
that management establishes policies and expectations for performance of tasks. It is
through procedures that the approval and coordination of work necessary to ensure
personnel and equipment safety are assured. All NPPs have thousands of administrative,
technical, and operational procedures to specify everything from how to plan for a
refueling outage, to training and qualification requirements, to how to operate or even
rebuild a reactor coolant pump. Most stations even have a procedure on how to follow
procedures. If you ask a manager about a certain aspect of how his or her station
operates, the first reaction is to direct you to the applicable procedure. Yet, the growing
recognition of two cultures is beginning to change things. According to Simon, "Most
managers and system designers of industrial installations used to assume that operator
decision-making was rational in the sense of objective optimization. They expected
operators to optimize the expected objective values of the various uncertain outcomes for
a decision problem. Psychology, however, has shown that humans do not behave
rationally as expected" (Simon, 1955). In other words, managers expected operators to
recognize procedural requirements as the logical, optimum set of behaviors and therefore
follow them. Interestingly, there are those who argue that deviating from procedures is
not necessarily a bad thing. Mosneron-Dupin et al cite many experiments that have been
carried out to investigate the structural deviations from rational decision making. It is
recognized that such deviations should not be categorized as 'human errors'. These
'irrational' behaviors could also result in superior outcomes for practical situations"
(Mosneron-Dupin et al 1997).
4.2 Current Thinking
Because of the potential significance of the issue of procedure non-compliance, a
brief review of recent work performed by the leaders in the field of human performance is
in order. Some of the more prevalent opinions concerning why workers and operators
deviate from established procedures include:
1) Familiarity with the task -
"Uncertainty declines as the information known about a subject improves.
Consequently, familiarity (knowledge, skill, and experience) with a task
will generally determine the level of attention (degree of information
processing) or mental functions required to perform and activity. People
tend to default to the lowest level of mental effort they perceive necessary
to satisfactorily achieve task requirements" (Reason, 1994)
2) Eagerness to act -
"During troubled conditions, operators are inclined to perform actions
sooner than required by procedures (anticipating actions) to reduce stress
and let off nervous tension. They also do this to get margins for working
with lower stress and lower work load. For example, they will anticipate
actions (perform prematurely) to reduce subsequent time constraints (save
time later)" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
3) Reluctance to undertake unusual actions or actions with negative consequences
* "Operators are reluctant to perform procedure steps if:
- the consequences of the actions appear to be disproportionate to
their contribution
- the actions are contrary to the operator's control habits (and, of
course, if the operator does not understand them properly)
In both cases, they can think that the procedure is not optimal for the real
situation, or even that it is erroneous" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
* "There is a reluctance to engage in concentrated thinking requiring high
levels of attention; reliance on familiar patterns and applying well-tried
solutions, settling for satisfactory rather than optimal courses of action.
(Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
4) Fixation -
* "Operators and workers tend to "stay on the rails" they switched on to at
the beginning of an event or phase of an event. This tendency is
exaggerated by stress and can be very strong under accident conditions.
Specifically:
- information likely to invalidate the initial diagnosis or to require
a modification to the objectives or of the adopted strategy will be
taken into account less easily than by applying no modification
- it will be harder to initiate operations of types different to the
current ones" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997).
* "There is a tendency to "see" only what the mind is tuned to see;
information that doesn't fit a mind set may not be noticed and vice versa;
missing that which is not expected or seeing something that is not really
present" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
* "Many operators and workers have difficulty seeing their own error,
particularly omissions, since one may be too close to a task or preoccupied
with other tasks" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
* "When confronted with indications of an abnormal occurrence, people
actively try to construct a coherent, logical explanation to account for their
observations" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
* "When a new symptom is inconsistent with their expectation, it may be
discounted or misinterpreted in a way to make it consistent with the
expectations derived from the current situation model" (Mosneron-Dupin,
et al, 1997)
5) Overconfidence -
* "A typical behavior observed by members of the (operations simulator)
group is overconfidence in the reliability of one's own performance
(including both diagnosis and execution of actions)" (Mosneron-Dupin, et
al, 1997)
* "A typical behavior observed by members of the (operations simulator)
group is reduced vigilance when perceiving essential success. (Mosneron-
Dupin, et al, 1997)
6) Omitting to call for help
* "A typical behavior observed by members of the (operations simulator)
group was omitting to call for help when needed (to save face, prestige,
pride, etc.)" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
7) Limited perspective -
* "The human mind is unable to perceive all the facts pertinent to a decision;
similar to attempting to see all the objects of a locked room through a
door's keyhole (bounded rationality)" (Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997)
* "An operator is typically faced with an information environment
containing more variables that can realistically be monitored." (Mosneron-
Dupin, et al, 1997)
* "When written procedures are available and judged appropriate for the
current situation, the need to generate a response plan in real time may be
largely eliminated. However, even when a procedure is available, some
aspects of planning will still be performed. Operators still need to a)
identify appropriate goals based on their own situation assessment b)
select the appropriate procedure c) evaluate whether the procedure-defined
actions are sufficient to achieve those goals, an d) adapt the procedure to
the situation if necessary. (Thompson, et al, 1997)
4.3 Procedure Errors vs. Procedure Violations
It should be noted that the majority of work performed to date focuses on how
people can make "honest mistakes". The studies are based on a fundamental assumption
that most workers and operators want to "do the right thing", but due to circumstances
beyond their control, they are unable to comply with procedural requirements. The
premise is that most people do not intentionally make mistakes. A more subtle and less
thoroughly investigated aspect is the situation where operators and workers are not as
concerned with doing things exactly "by the book" as they are with not wanting things to
go wrong. This is the fine line between procedure error and procedure violation. A
procedure error (an error made while following a procedure) is an action that
unintentionally departs from an expected behavior according to some standard (Sanders
& Moray, 1991). Conversely, a procedure violation involves a deliberate deviation from
expected behavior. Procedure error involves problems with the mental processing of
task-related information. Procedure violation involves motivational factors characteristic
of the individual or organization (Maurina, et al, 1995). Procedure violations typically
begin with workers in the rule-based performance mode, then deciding they want or need
to enter into the skill-based performance mode, and actually end up in the knowledge-
based mode, where errors are most likely to be committed. Mosneron-Dupin, et al, refer
to this as "errors of intention", where "operators intend to perform an action that is
incorrect but that they believe to..... represent a superior method of
performance"(Mosneron-Dupin, et al, 1997).
With so many studies and so many differing opinions, agreeing on how to even
define and determine the optimum use or content of a procedure or work instruction or
trying to establish measures of procedure quality can be a daunting task. Perhaps the
most widely accepted notion of procedure quality is that expressed by Forzano and
Castagna, who state that "All activities can be described by procedures, and procedures
quality may be determined on the basis of their ability to satisfy user requirements,
expressed in terms of clarity, simplicity and comprehensibility"(Forzano, et al, 1997).
Difficulty in developing and using work instructions has grown to the point that, in 1997,
requests for assistance in improving work instructions was the leading request made to
the INPO maintenance department.' Compounding the dilemma is the reality that
7 Personal knowledge gained as INPO Maintenance Department Assistance Coordinator, 1996-1997.
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procedures successfully meeting the needs of users at one NPP may not be adequate at
another station.
For a variety of reasons, no two NPPs in the United States are the same in design
or operation. They vary in age, capacity, fundamental design, operating characteristics,
and even design basis. In a similar way, the amount of technical knowledge resident
within the staff varies significantly with factors such as average years of experience,
types of positions held, and the composition of the local labor market. For example,
before it shut down in 1997, the average maintenance worker at Northeast Utilities'
Connecticut Yankee station had over 15 years experience at the station.8 Compare this to
the TVA Watts Bar station, which has been in operation less than two years. Or with
Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point station, that has an annual turnover rate for its
operators of close to 20 percent. 9
Consideration of the uniqueness of station personnel, however, has not commonly
been applied when developing human performance improvement plans. Instead, stations
typically have looked to the rest of the industry to find other stations that have been
successful in reducing human errors ("benchmarked"), and then have attempted to
implement the same program at their own station. As can be seen with the preceding
human performance information, this approach has had only limited success.
4.4 Industry Survey
To further explore the complex relationship between behavioral studies and
theories, and the difficult reality of trying to generate useful work instructions for the
myriad tasks at a nuclear station, a survey was developed. There were several objectives
for the survey. The first was to determine whether opinions concerning the adequacy of
procedures were consistent between stations or whether some stations were more satisfied
than others. The second objective was to better understand why workers might be
dissatisfied with different aspects of the procedures they were expected to use. The third
objective was to determine the principal reasons for workers failing to follow the
S Personal discussion with Connecticut Yankee Manger of Maintenance, September 1994.
9 Personal discussion with Turkey Point Manager of Maintenance, June 1995.
procedure as written. And finally, the survey was intended to compare what behaviorists
believe to be the reasons for procedure error or violation with what the actual workers
feel are the reasons.
The survey was administered to a total of 45 individuals at six different NPPs 10,
representing maintenance electricians and mechanics, operators, quality control
inspectors, and maintenance planners. Questions focused on the general opinion of
maintenance, operations, and support staff personnel that regularly used procedures in
their daily routine. Participants were told only that the goal of the survey was to study
how procedures were typically used, how useful procedures were in preventing human
errors, and to solicit any suggestions for improving procedures to better meet the needs of
the technicians and operators that use them. A copy of the survey is included as
Attachment A. Some of the more noteworthy survey results include:
* The respondents were evenly split when asked whether procedures contained too
much detail. One person stated "they are written for the lowest level trained person,
and the detail is mind boggling". Others (even from the same utility) felt more
information was necessary to be able to perform the task without error.
* The higher the level of experience of the respondent, the more likely the belief that
procedures were too detailed. The less experienced workers tended to be the ones to
want more information.
* Workers were frequently unable to perform a procedure from start to finish. The most
cited cause for having to stop work was to get additional clarification of procedure
intent from a supervisor. One worker stated he was able to complete a procedure only
one percent of the time without having to stop and go to a supervisor. The average
for all respondents being able to complete work instructions without stopping was just
over half the time (54%).
10 Survey developed by the author contained 12 questions and was provided to 45 randomly chosen
workers and operators at six different NPPs during the week of March 31, 1998. See Attachment A
* One senior worker (22 years of experience) from a different utility also expressed
problems with procedure complexity, but had a different response. The respondent
cited working the job without stopping 90 percent of the time, but added the caveat
that if he or his people "were to stop every time we needed something, we would go
nowhere .... (work) backlogs are going up because upper managers are stressing
verbatim procedure compliance. They (managers) have not had to work on
equipment before."
* When asked whether the procedures routinely used for their work are helpful,
unnecessary, or actually get in the way, slightly more than half of the respondents felt
they were either unnecessary or got in the way.
In order to further analyze this issue, one of the surveyed NPPs performed a larger
scale survey, polling 290 employees from a wide variety of organizations within the NPP
to better determine why they had difficulty following procedures, and what they thought
could be done to improve them. To the question of why procedures were difficult to
follow, the most frequent response by far (38 percent) was that procedures were too
complicated The next most common response (11 percent) was that time demands for
completion of the task precluded strict compliance with the procedure as written. To the
question of what could be done to improve procedural compliance, the most frequent
response by far (29.4 percent) was to recommend procedure simplification, and 12.2
percent wanted better training on the frequent changes to procedure content.
This survey information was then combined with root-cause analyses that had
been performed by the station in response to NRC Notice of Violation 97-80-01, a
February 1995 NRC Enforcement Conference, Licensee Event Report 293-94007, and
procedure use deficiencies listed in NRC Inspection Reports from 1995-1997. Detailed
analyses performed by a panel of workers and managers arrived at a root cause for
procedure use deficiencies that reinforced what they had suspected for some time - that
the "excessive number of mistakes being made by organization personnel during the
performance of administrative procedures" was "attributed to the excessively restrictive
and burdensome requirements embedded in our administrative procedures." ''
4.5 Survey Conclusions
These findings are quite significant. For, although the sample size of the survey
of workers at different stations was somewhat limited, several important conclusions can
be drawn. The first important point is that the causes for procedure non-compliance most
often cited by behaviorists were validated. Approximately half of the respondents
pointed to issues such as overconfidence, being distracted by outside influences, or
schedule pressure as the reasons for deviating from written instructions. More striking,
however, was that, when responding to the question of why they skipped procedure steps
or committed errors, about half of those surveyed provided answers that were not well
documented in the current literature. Many respondents cited getting "lost" in the
procedure or trying to interpret the intent of the procedure writer. Therefore, while
fixation, overconfidence, and familiarity with the task are important contributors to
procedure non-adherence, there appear to be additional reasons for non-compliance that
are not well documented in the literature. Addressing the "missing piece" of procedural
complexity and how procedure usability factors in the human performance equation will
be an important part of reversing the slowdown in human error reduction. Accordingly,
the remainder of this work will focus on possible methods to account for procedure
complexity and worker uncertainty.
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5.0 New Approaches - A Technique for Achieving Optimum
Balance of the Three Critical Barriers to Human Error
As an approach to better include the uniqueness of personnel and situations at
each station when addressing human performance improvement, we propose a simple
model, centered on three important components of human performance improvement.
Of course, if one wished to disaggregate the possible contributors to human error, the list
could easily number in the dozens. For example, Tuli, et al, use 20 different factors in
their analysis of organizational deficiencies (Tuli, et al, 1996). Instead, this approach
attempts to simplify the complex issue of human error in terms that workers, supervisors,
and managers can easily relate to. Those three components are:
* Usability / Level of detail in work instructions
* Worker/operator knowledge (including training)
* Supervisor oversight
The governing "equation" for the model is simply:
A%(Procedure Detail) + B% (Worker knowledge) + C%(Supervisor Oversight) =
Optimum Work Performance
where A, B, and C can be any variables. As has been seen, there is no "perfect" or
standard combination, because of the almost infinite combinations of systems, worker
knowledge, and plant operating conditions. As can also be surmised, the equation is not
intended to be an "equation" in a scientific or purely mathematical sense. It is, rather, a
conceptual, or mnemonic, tool for emphasizing the need for balance between
components that each play an important role in preventing human error.
The A + B + C concept, in contrast to the "one size fits all" approach frequently
used, emphasizes that each situation should be evaluated to determine the optimal
combination of the three factors. Additionally, it is important to point out that there are
many other terms that could be added to this equation. The quality of communications,
organizational effectiveness, or even the time of day could all be identified as individual
contributors. Only three terms were chosen for this model to avoid disaggregation and
the increase in complexity that would accompany such an effort. Indeed, the terms were
selected in order to allow the combination of several human factors or organizational
factors into one term for ease of memory. The terms can be loosely defined as:
Adequacy / Level of detail in work instructions- How easy is it for the specific
worker assigned the task to follow the instructions? Is the level of detail adequate
to perform all required steps without having to stop and receive additional
information, direction, or approval? Is the procedure overly prescriptive or
complex given the nature and scope of the task? This term encompasses many
aspects of the "communications" and "formalization" organizational factors used
by Tuli, et al, and which they credit with being the third largest cause of errors
during the execution of maintenance work and the largest cause of documentation
errors. (Tuli, et al, 1996)
Worker / Operator level of knowledge (including training) - Does the worker have
the formal training and work experience to correctly perform the work being
assigned. This term combines the "organizational learning", "training", "technical
knowledge", organizational factors used by Tuli, et al., and which they credit as
being the two largest causes of errors when executing corrective and preventive
maintenance work practices. (Tuli, et al, 1996)
Supervisor oversight - How involved does the supervisor become in the task?
How much explanation, coaching, or field supervision is required. Which
individuals should be assigned the task? How much interaction with other
organizations is required to ensure the task is performed properly? This term
combines key elements of Tuli, et al's, "personnel selection", coordination of
work", and "roles-responsibilities" organizational factors, which encompass many
of the leading causes of errors that occur during the scheduling, coordination,
and execution of work. (Tuli, et al, 1996).
It can therefore be seen that although there are only three terms for the worker or
supervisor to remember when using the A + B + C approach, they represent a large
portion of the sources of human error. A more detailed explanation and analysis of each
of the terms is presented in the following sections.
5.1 Component "A" - Adequacy/Level of Detail in Work Instructions
When equipment is to be repaired, adjusted, or operated, there are specific,
minimal requirements that must be addressed. Then, based on the complexity of the
particular system or component, the significance in relation to plant safety and reliability,
and past operating experience, additional information can be added. The same approach
can be applied to development of work task procedures. Establish a minimum
requirement for procedure content, and then supplement only as the situation requires.
Forzano and Castagna suggest that the content (referred to as quality by the authors) of
any procedure, or document, can be split into two classes: the substantial quality and the
formal quality (Forzane & Castagna, 1997). The substantial quality refers to the
technical details and accuracy of the instructions, and depends on the subject knowledge
of the procedure writer and his/her ability to effectively express that knowledge. Formal
quality refers to the design, structure, and format of the procedure itself. Formal quality,
they argue, is perhaps just as important as substantial quality, where "a good presentation
depends heavily on an appropriate 'story', with a logical, clear, step-by-step structure,
from goal definition, to descriptions of major topics, to details" (Forzane & Castagna,
1997). Formal content is independent from substantial content, can be incorporated into
a standard, and significantly influences understanding of substantial content.
In his book "The Industrial Operator's Handbook", Hop Howlett notes that
"Effective procedures share a few common characteristics - they must be clear, concise,
and easy to understand by a competent technician. It must be emphasized that the
procedure must be written with the competent technician in mind. It is a dangerous and
fallacious notion to believe that detailed procedures can substitute for proper training.
Good procedures are a vital adjunct to proper training, not a substitute"(Howlett, 1995).
Admiral Hyman Rickover was also an opponent of overly detailed procedures. His
philosophy was; "We train our people in theory because you can never postulate every
accident that might happen. The only real safety you have is each operator having a
theoretical and practical knowledge of the plant so he can react in any
emergency"(Howlett, 1995). Although the size and complexity of US naval nuclear
reactors differs from those of commercial NPPs, it is interesting to note that the Navy has
accumulated more total reactor operation hours than the US commercial industry, yet has
never suffered a significant reactor accident.
Why do workers deviate from written instructions? In part, at least, because of
inconsistencies between the instructions and the conditions of the plant. There is a
contradiction between the logic of the rule and the logic of the desired task outcome.
According to Montmayeul,, et al, there are two opposing points of view; one stresses the
mandatory nature of adherence to instructions, while the other proclaims the need for
global understanding of the situation. To do the right thing, you have to understand what
you are doing. To reduce anxiety you have to reduce uncertainty. The difference
between the prescribed (formal) task and the real (informal) activity is the need for the
worker / operator to prioritize actions, decide between contradictory rules, and take
account of the dynamics of phenomena and work situations which are always a little
different to what is foreseen in formal procedures. The authors conclude with the belief
that "too much formalization of work, with increasingly detailed and complex
procedures, could have a negative effect on operators. For the future, it is desirable to
rehabilitate the professional approach and know how of operators, and to insist on their
positive behavior (i.e. not just see them as an unreliability factor)." (Montmayeul , et al,
1994)
As was identified in the results of the survey addressed earlier, workers have
widely varying opinions of the amount of detail that should be in work instructions. Less
experienced workers need more background information, while more experienced
workers find such non-essential information burdensome and sometimes confusing. Yet
the system currently used to schedule maintenance and testing at most NPPs is unable to
identify the specific maintenance workers, or operator, that will be performing a task.
Therefore, the planner typically attempts to include every possible step, contingency,
diagram, and reference that the most inexperienced worker might need. In many cases,
this information is not needed, and requires later removal or marking as "not applicable",
tends to obscure the truly important information, and unnecessarily slows down and
complicates the planning and review cycle.
Instead, work instructions or operating procedures should contain the essential
information an experienced worker needs to perform the assigned task. In other words,
try to simplify the equation by making "A" a constant. One way to do this would be to
have procedure writers and end-users agree upon the desired formal content, as well as
the minimum acceptable substantial content. With this done, procedure writers will not
be faced with the challenge of trying to predict the level of knowledge or experience level
of the potential user. Similarly, users will be able to have a consistent tool to use. And
in terms of our human performance improvement model, only two variables remain to be
managed.
5.2 Component "B" - Worker/Operator Level of Knowledge
The second most common corrective action to prevent recurrence of human errors
is to improve worker knowledge through increased training. A second survey was
conducted to determine the average amount of training for selected work groups at a
typical NPP.'2 The results of the survey are presented in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Annual Training Hours
12 Based on informal survey conducted 23 February, 1998. Sample population included 30 auxiliary
operators, 57 licensed operators, 16 STAs, 95 mechanical maintenance technicians, 100 electrical/I&C
technicians, 30 maintenance supervisors, 37 chemistry and 60 RP technicians.
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These numbers represent only the training related specifically to their unique job
descriptions. General employee training covering items such as personnel safety, plant
physical security, and radiation worker training are additional. These figures also do not
include initial job qualification training, which varies significantly from plant to plant but
can require hundreds or even thousands of additional hours of training. It is therefore
obvious that training is a major time investment, and can consume up to 20 percent of a
worker's available time every year.
Yet, is the training being effectively selected? Or, more importantly, are stations
and supervisors able to effectively determine the true level of a worker's ability to
perform a task? Stations need a way to be able to quantify a worker's level of
knowledge. The most common situation is where workers participate in an
apprenticeship program and eventually earn the designation of journeyman. Qualification
to perform a task is based on attending a designated training class and successful
completion of a written exam and/or actual demonstration of the skill. Once qualified,
the worker typically retains the qualification indefinitely, subject to periodic refresher
training. That is to say, most NPPs do not have a periodic requalification for their
maintenance workers. Such periodic testing is mandatory for operators based on NRC
licensing requirements.
The possible ramifications of a worker being able to qualify and remain certified
to perform a task for five years or more years, for example, without ever actually
performing the work or being recertified, are obvious. Keeping abreast of modifications
to the equipment or the required maintenance practices that change over time is an
obvious challenge, and is typically addressed through a continuing training program. The
level of detail of continuing training is typically less than that of initial qualification and
only a fraction of the various equipment types and maintenance techniques can be
reviewed each year. And some types of maintenance are only required to be performed a
few times over the 40-year life of the plant. As a result, the possibility exists for a worker
to go several years without performing a task or attending task-specific training. Efforts
in recent years have been successful in identifying these infrequently performed
evolutions and providing "just-in-time" training. However, if worker knowledge is to be
an effective barrier for preventing human error, there must be a method in place that
allows a supervisor to effectively determine the true knowledge of the individual being
assigned a task. The National Academy for Nuclear Training has developed
recommendations for the continuing training of workers. They emphasize that since
much of the system and component training workers receive during their initial
qualification is not reinforced by direct use, a periodic training review of selected systems
and components is recommended. The level of detail and difficulty of this training is left
up to each individual station, based on their opinion of the importance to plant safety,
reliability, and the performance of the task.
5.3 Component "C" - Supervisory Oversight
Although the A + B + C method can be used by anyone, tie is most applicable to
the work supervisor. To supplement the previous two method of preventing human error,
many stations attempt to increase the amount of supervisory personnel in the field
overseeing work being performed. A standard practice in the nuclear industry has been to
formally direct maintenance supervisors spend a significant portion of each workday
(typically 50 percent) in the field ensuring work is done properly. After all, ensuring
maintenance is performed efficiently and correctly is the primary role of the work
supervisor. The supervisor, however, has additional duties and responsibilities.
Reviewing upcoming maintenance procedures for technical content and checking
completed work documents for accuracy and completeness is an important part of the
supervisor's role. Supervisors are also heavily involved in personnel matters such as
developing performance appraisals, managing vacation and training schedules, and
assisting in the development of future work schedules. All of these additional duties can
detract from the supervisor's ability to be in the field observing the actual performance of
work. Deciding which work to spend the limited time available observing, therefore, is a
critical skill for the supervisor to develop.
Typically, it is the first-line maintenance supervisor (job foreman) or operations
shift supervisor who assigns specific tasks to specific individuals. In many cases, such
assignments are not made until immediately before the work is to be performed. Because
of their job experience and frequent contact with the workers, first-line supervisors are
usually the most knowledgeable of the complexity of the task being assigned, and are also
the most knowledgeable of the training and skills of the individuals that will be
performing the task. The supervisor is typically involved in the review and approval of
work instructions during the task planning phase, and participates in the scheduling and
coordination of the work his/her will perform during coming weeks. The supervisor is
therefore familiar with the work to be performed by the time the task is to be executed.
By applying the A% (procedure detail) + B% (worker knowledge) + C%
(supervisor oversight) concept, if the supervisor knows the worker being assigned the
task is very knowledgeable (B is large), a basic procedure (A is small and constant) and
little supervisor oversight (C is small) may be sufficient. If instead the workers have not
had much experience with the task (B is small), the supervisor can supplement
information in the procedure (A remains constant) and provide a more detailed prejob
briefing and spending more time in the field overseeing and coaching the workers (C is
large).
The importance of the supervisor's ability to understand the task being performed,
the capabilities of the workers, and the significance and potential pitfalls of the task being
performed is obvious. In fact, the ability to detect error-likely situations and to head off
preventable events depends largely on how well these factors are understood regarding
their role in human error (Reason, 1990). These error-likely situations, or times when an
error is about to occur, typically exist when the demands of the task exceed the
capabilities of the individual or when work conditions exist that aggravate limitations of
human nature (Swain & Guttman, 1983). Accordingly, INPO's Human Performance
Fundamentals Course (INPO Human Performance Fundamentals Course Student
Handbook, 1997) discusses common attributes that can contribute to error-likely
situations such as:
Demands of the task - the specific mental, physical, and team requirements
necessary to accomplish the task successfully, e.g., workload, time pressure, roles
and responsibilities, and standards
Individual capabilities - the unique mental, physical, and emotional abilities of a
particular person assigned to perform a specific task, e.g., familiarity with the
task, values, education, knowledge, skills, attitudes, personality, experience,
health and fitness, age, and communication skills
Work environment - general influence of the workplace, organizational and
cultural conditions that affect individual behavior, e.g., distractions, equipment
layout, tagout procedures, attitude toward various hazards, and work control
processes.
Human nature - generic traits or dispositions, limitations that may incline
individuals to err under certain unfavorable conditions, e.g., habit, short-term
memory, fatigue, stress, complacency, emotion, and mental shortcuts.
While the preceding list is in no way complete, it makes obvious the futility of
attempting to develop procedures that can anticipate and make provisions for these types
of factors. Instead, these issues could be removed from procedures and the supervisor
become more involved. Reason echoes this idea when he argues that "It is critical that
personnel, particularly managers, become more aware of the human potential for errors,
the task, the workplace, and organizational factors that shape their likelihood and their
consequences. Understanding how and why unsafe acts occur is the essential first step in
effective error management" (Reason, 1990).
In addition to alleviating some of the problems caused by procedural complexity,
the A + B + C concept has the potential to reduce the impact of some of the error-
producing human behaviors cited in sections 4.2-4.4. For example, by conducting a
thorough pre-job briefing and questioning workers about the specifics of work to be
performed, the supervisor can identify knowledge weaknesses and remove some of the
overconfidence workers may have felt. Asking questions about possible task scenarios
and "what-if' questions can reduce the feeling of familiarity with the task that workers
generate when things usually go according to plan. And periodic visits by a supervisor to
the site of the task and personally observing the performance of work may identify
incorrect conditions and eliminate the need for the worker or operator to call for help.
The A + B + C concept will not, however, address many other human
performance deficiencies. A supervisor, procedure writer, or an instructor cannot
anticipate the tendency for workers to be eager to act under troubling conditions, or their
tendency to become fixed on a specific scenario. The A + B + C model is simply a way
to allow workers, supervisors, planners, and instructors to consider the need for a
balanced approach for preventing human error.
6.0 A Case Study
To put the A + B + C thought process into more tangible terms, consider an event
that occurred at the Quad Cities NPP (NRC Licensee Event Report 254-94011). On
August 29, 1994, operations personnel were performing hot scram timing tests when
control rod drive (CRD) unit L-11 failed to scram. The failure to scram was caused by a
1/2-inch pipe plug inserted into the control valve exhaust port. Because the exhaust port
was plugged, instrument air could not be vented, and the backup scram valve would have
also been prevented from operating on a full scram signal. The pipe plug was installed by
mechanics while performing maintenance during the recently completed refueling outage.
The maintenance procedure did not direct the use of a pipe plug, nor would a pipe plug
have been required, if the procedure had been followed correctly. Subsequent
investigation of the event revealed several factors of interest:
* informal work practices associated with mechanical maintenance activities on
the hydraulic control units (HCUs) The LER states that "the informal work
practice involved deviating from the procedure that governs maintenance on
the HCU scram valves."
* the work procedure was found to be "inaccurate, steps out of sequence,
confusing, and not designed for less practiced users". Corrective actions
included "investigating the feasibility of splitting the HCU repair procedure
into separate steps due to the large number of different maintenance activities
incorporated within it. The procedure is currently cumbersome and confusing
to maintenance personnel that are required to perform the maintenance
activities."
* the workers assigned to perform the task had not received initial training on
control rod drive unit scram valve maintenance activities
* lack of supervisor involvement. In fact, the supervisor was not even aware
that the workers were deviating from the procedure requirements.
Had the supervisor in charge of this maintenance applied the A + B + C thought
process, this error most probably would not have occurred. The supervisor could have
identified the need to compensate for the lack of training of the workers, the safety
significance of the equipment being repaired, and the lack of procedure detail, by
periodically visiting the job site to make sure work was being performed correctly. If
spending additional time in the field was impractical, the supervisor could have instead
chosen a different (more experienced) worker to work with the less experienced worker in
order to increase the overall level of worker knowledge. And if that option were also not
available, the supervisor might have supplemented the work procedure to provide
clarification to allow the workers to complete the task successfully. In other words, the
important thing to identify and particular weaknesses and then find the optimum balance
to compensate for the weakness.
7.0 Current Initiatives
7.1 The Procedure Usability Measurement Process (PUMP)
A principal reason for not being more successful in tailoring procedures to the
unique needs of a specific station has been the lack of adequate tools to allow a
quantifiable determination of how well procedures are meeting the needs of the user.
Accordingly, EPRI has begun work specifically geared to improving procedure usability
through measurement of procedure adequacy. Their work began with a survey of 21
NPPs, where maintenance managers identified 19 major categories of procedure-related
problems that cost an average plant up to $1 million in lost power generation and
equipment damage (McCallum ,, et al, 1994). Of the 19 categories, many directly
determined procedure usability. Those categories were:
* excessive page turning
* difficult language
* poor organization
* too much detail
* awkward formatting
* ill-conceived graphics
Building upon this early work, EPRI has developed the Procedure Usability
Measurement Process (PUMP) as a systematic process for measuring how well workers
can use task-based procedures. It is EPRI's belief that PUMP will be able to create
empirical data on procedure usability that can quantify procedure problems, diagnose
specific procedure weaknesses, and guide remedial actions in areas such as procedure
writing and training (Spiker, 1997). Basically, the PUMP consists of a 50-item test that
focuses on a particular task-based procedure and covers the procedure's content, format,
and organization. Ten functional elements (level of detail, navigation, comprehensibility,
assumed knowledge, readability, internal logic, graphics, work practices, terminology,
and salience) are then graded. The PUMP process is designed as a test of the procedure,
and not a test of the examinee. Therefore, analysis of the types of items most frequently
missed gives an indication of necessary changes.
A pilot test of this process was conducted at the Zion NPP in 1996 and the results
were quite interesting. A mechanical maintenance task (air operated valve (AOV)
repacking) and an administrative-based task (foreign material exclusion) were chosen for
evaluation. Ten journeyman mechanics with experience ranging from 4 to 16 years took
the AOV test. Eight other examinees, also journeyman mechanics with between 3 and 23
years of experience, took the foreign material exclusion test. The average score on the
AOV test was 88%, with individual scores ranging from 76% to 95%. Ideally, scores
should be at or near 100%. For the foreign material exclusion test, the average score was
slightly lower at 85.8%, with individual scores ranging from 79% to 92%. In both cases,
statistical tests indicated that there was no direct relationship between years of experience
and test performance (Spiker, 1997).
Several important lessons were learned from the test. For example, 30% of the
salience functional elements on the AOV test were missed by the examinees. Typical
salience elements are things such as failing to associate a CAUTION statement with the
task step below it, failing to read critical information embedded in a NOTE section, or
failing to read the NOTE section at all. For the foreign material exclusion test, the most
frequently missed items were comprehensibility, internal logic, terminology, and
navigation. Representative errors from these functional elements include:
* did not know the meaning of "initial foreign inspection"
(comprehensibility)
* confusion about when a physical boundary would be used in a foreign
material exclusion area (internal logic)
* did not know definition of SOER (terminology)
* double-sided copying made it difficult to find sections off the page
(navigation). (Spiker, 1997)
Information derived from the PUMP performed on these two procedures resulted
in 77 recommendations for improvement, and covered every aspect of the procedure. For
example, the test data showed that examinees were not reading through the NOTE data
carefully, presuming that it contained supplemental rather than vital information. It was
therefore recommended that all task step information be removed from the NOTE
sections. It was also recommended that endnotes be removed from the procedure all
together, since they were "taking the user off the page" in search of information that was
neither interpretable nor essential to the task at hand. (Spiker, 1997)
Besides showing opportunities to improve the usability of procedures, the PUMP
also identified a number of possibilities for improving technical task training, procedure
writing training, and functional literacy training. Narrowing the gap between the
knowledge level expected by the procedure writer and the actual training received is a
critical part of reducing procedure-induced errors. In the case of the pilot test at Zion,
the foreign material exclusion procedure PUMP test data suggests that a training
adequacy review be performed in the areas of terminology, worker responsibilities for
specific foreign material exclusion tasks, and identification, establishment, and
designation of the different foreign material exclusion area zones. (Spiker, 1997)
7.2 Pilgrim's Procedure Improvement Program
Several NPPs have started developing programs that embody some of the key
aspects of the A + B + C technique. After a series of violations cited by the NRC for
failure to follow procedures, the Pilgrim NPP formed a task force to analyze and correct
the problem. Their conclusion was that the principal cause of procedure error was that
"the structure and content of the procedures are complex. This inhibits performing tasks
in a timely and complete manner." In order to correct this situation, they recently
decided to establish a team made up of representatives from a variety of functional
disciplines in order to specify the minimum level of detail required in procedures and to
establish a reasonable definition of "procedure compliance". The desired end product of
their work is a streamlined description of the necessary information to perform a task,
absent the superfluous information that dilutes the important material.
7.3 McGuire's Maintenance Risk Assessment (MRA) Program
The maintenance department at the McGuire NPP was one of the first to attempt
to find a method to prioritize the work involvement of supervisors. They use their PSA
model to generate a maintenance risk assessment (MRA) to identify the potential impacts
of scheduled maintenance and provide timely information to station workers in support of
station nuclear safety and plant reliability13. In doing so, they believe their supervisors
are able to better provide a level of field oversight commensurate with the potential risks
identified with each activity. Every day before work is scheduled to begin, managers
meet with job supervisors to assess potential plant and personnel risks associated with
each work activity. Special consideration is given to activities such as the following:
* impacting safety-related equipment
* affecting core reactivity or monitoring
* involving high dose or radiological hazard
* requiring work on unisolable lines
These risks are identified on a maintenance daily risk assessment form for each activity,
and a low, medium, or high-risk category is assigned based on this assessment. As the
risk of the activity increases, so does the level of management attention and oversight,
along with implementation of the following requirements:
* more detailed communication during prejob briefings, structured job
turnovers, and postjob critiques.
* development of contingency plans to address or mitigate the identified risks
* increased technical oversight and field involvement by supervision
* increased emphasis on coordination of involved groups.
This information is then presented to all maintenance workers prior to starting
work during a department meeting. The meeting provides all workers with an overview
of the most risk-significant tasks for the day.
'3 Maintenance Activity Risk Assessment Process at McGuire Nuclear Station, The Nuclear Exchange,
Nov. 1996.
Although the McGuire MRA method does not include worker knowledge or
procedure detail into consideration, it is still an improvement. For their unique station
makeup, emphasizing "C" is an important part of obtaining the optimum human
performance balance. Since the development and use of MRA, the number of
maintenance-related personnel errors (rework) has decreased from 70 in 1993 to 12 in
1996.
7.4 Callaway's Human Performance Initiative
The Callaway NPP has taken a somewhat different approach. Encouraged by
their success in reducing turbine vulnerability to single-point failures, they began to
expand the scope of this reliability improvement technique beyond just the equipment
and apply it to human performance. (Hughes, & Bradley, 1992) Their effort began with
evaluations of plant performance and abnormal events, technical evaluations of plant
activities to identify potential problem areas, failure modes and effects analysis, reviews
of logic prints and electrical cabinet wiring, and probabilistic safety analysis. As a result
of their efforts, over 250 potential trip signals were identified, prioritized and evaluated
for both the impact on the plant and required operator intervention in the case of failure.
Those equipment single-point vulnerabilities found to have the highest potential to cause
an inadvertent trip were eliminated with simple modifications such as adding a redundant
power supply or change to the trip signal logic. Human error vulnerabilities were also
evaluated. Corrective actions included things such as installing blocking devices between
similar controls, avoiding multi-mode switches or controls, improving the human factors
layout of controls, automating tasks less suited for human beings, and modifying plant
equipment to be insensitive to slips. They have even gone so far to recognize that as the
work force ages, signs and labels need to get bigger so workers can continue to see them.
It is important to note that of all the potential trip sources identified and evaluated,
only approximately 20 percent were thought significant enough to require equipment
modification. The rest were addressed though changes in monitoring or preventive
maintenance frequencies. Dr. Gary Hughes, Callaway's Director of Plant Safety, refers
to their efforts as "engineering the human out of the equation". Various studies have
shown that when it comes to defense-in-depth, physical barriers are more reliable than
administrative barriers since physical defenses will perform despite human action,
whereas administrative defenses usually depend on the individual's adherence to
guidelines.
8.0 Conclusion / Future Work
As machine bureaucracies, nuclear power stations have been and will continue to
be heavily dependent on formal procedures for both routine and abnormal operations.
Over the years, however, the size and complexity of procedures has continued to grow to
the point where now, those procedures may have started becoming a contributor to human
performance deficiencies instead of preventing them. Most of the work performed to
date has focused on psychological aspects of procedure errors and procedure violations.
Much of that work has been validated by studies where workers are actually observed
deviating from procedures they know they are required to follow. However, the problem
of procedure complexity and the significant impact it has on procedure errors has not
been given the same amount of attention as other causes.
Recognition of the negative impact of procedure complexity is insufficient to
prevent human errors. The great diversity in equipment configurations, plant conditions,
and knowledge of workers, even at the same station, make one level of procedure
inadequate for all situations. Instead, the procedure should act as a fundamental building
block that can be supplemented with additional knowledge or supervisor involvement and
oversight as is appropriate for the unique situation.
Recent attention being brought to the various components of the A + B + C
method should help generate the data necessary to validate the assertions of this paper.
Additional surveys should be performed to determine the breadth of this issue. The
quantitative nature of the PUMP process and McGuire Station's maintenance risk
assessment program will also allow further work to refining and optimizing the three
factor approach to human performance improvement.
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ATTACHMENT A - Procedure Usability Survey
Discipline (Mechanic, Instrument Technician, Electrician, etc.)
Title (Apprentice, Journeyman, Master, etc.)
Approximate Years Experience
1. The type of procedure I most often use is a) maintenance procedure b) operating
procedure c) administrative procedure d) other . NOTE: It
will be assumed you are referring to this type of procedure for the remaining
questions. If referring to other types of procedures is specific questions, please
indicate so.
2. The last time I missed/skipped a step in a procedure, it was because.................
3. The last time I committed an error when performing a procedure it was because........
4. I a) always b) usually c) seldom have all the information necessary to
perform a procedure as written. An example of insufficient information is ..............
5. Can you recall a time when you did the correct thing by not following the procedure
as it was written? Please briefly describe
6. In most cases, the work instructions have a) too little background information and
details b) too much background and details c) just the right amount. An example
would be..............
7. "If I could change anything about our work instructions, it would be"............
8. "Many of our work instructions are too"......................
9. "The most frustrating thing about using some of our work packages is" .......................
10. "For most of the work I do on a regular basis, the work package..." a)
unnecessary c) gets in the way. An example would be...............
helps b) is
11. I am able to follow and complete the procedure from start to finish, without any need
for clarification or contacting a supervisor, approximately........percent of the time.
A common reason for having to stop is ..............
12. What is the most frequent problem with procedures or work instructions encountered
when trying to perform your job?
